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Abstract
Many philosophers of science have argued that social and ethical values have a 
significant role to play in core parts of the scientific process.  A question that 
naturally arises is: when such value choices need to be made, which or whose 
values should be used?  A common answer to this  question turns to political 
values — i.e. the values of the public or its representatives.  In this paper, I argue 
that this imposes a morally significant burden on certain scientists, effectively 
requiring them to advocate for policy positions they strongly disagree with.  I 
conclude by discussing under what conditions this burden might be justified.
1.  Values in Science and the Political View
By now, most philosophers of science probably agree that there is an important place for 
so-called contextual (i.e. personal, ethical, political) values in core parts of the scientific process, 
especially in areas where science is connected to policy-making.  Values may appropriately play 
a role in evaluating evidence (Douglas 2009), choosing scientific models (Elliott 2011), 
structuring quantitative measures (Reiss 2013, ch. 8; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010; Hausman 
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2015), and/or in preparing information for presentation to non-experts (Elliott 2006; Hardwig 
1994; Resnik 2001; Schroeder 2016).  The natural follow-up question has received less sustained 
attention:  when scientists should make use of values, which (or whose) values should they use?   2
In some cases, philosophers of science criticize a value choice on substantive ethical 
grounds (e.g. Shrader-Frechette 2008; Hoffmann and Stempsey 2008).  This suggests that the 
values to be used are the objectively correct ones.  A second common view gives scientists 
latitude to choose whatever (reasonable) values they prefer or think best, usually supplemented 
by a requirement of transparency.  This is suggested by many existing codes of scientific ethics, 
which impose few constraints on scientists in making such choices.   Finally, a third view says 3
that scientists ought to use the appropriate political values — that is, the values held or endorsed 
by the public or its representatives — at least when those values are informed and substantively 
reasonable.   The most straightforward argument for this view grounds it in considerations of 4
democracy or political legitimacy.  If certain value choices are going to ultimately influence 
policy, then the public or its representatives have a right to make those choices (Douglas 2005; 
Intemann 2015; cf. Steele 2012; Kitcher 2001).
There are, of course further possibilities, and these views can be combined in more 
complex ways (e.g. requiring scientists to use political values in some domains, while permitting 
them to use their personal values in others).  But if, for simplicity, we stick to these three primary 
 In some cases, the justification for incorporating values into the scientific process dictates an answer.  Feminist critiques of 2
historically androcentric fields, for example, suggest that non-androcentric values are needed as a corrective.  I set aside such 
cases in this paper.
 Mara Walli, Matthew Wong, and I discuss this at length in a work-in-progress.3
 I set aside, then, cases where the values, say, of a policy-maker are unreasonable, in the sense that they lie outside the range of 4
values that ought to be tolerated in a liberal society.  In such cases, an advocate of the political view may permit or require 
scientists to reject those unreasonable values.  (See e.g. Resnik 2001.)  Also, in this paper I will set aside the important question 
of what the political view ought to say when the values of the public diverge from the values of policy-makers.  The answer to 
this question, I think, will depend on one’s theory of political representation.
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options, I think the third, which I will call the political view, is the most attractive.  More 
precisely, I think that in most cases where values are called for in core parts of the scientific 
process, scientists should privilege political values.   The most obvious concern with this view, 5
and one that has received much attention from its advocates, is that it doesn’t seem practical.  It 
isn’t feasible to ask citizens or policy-makers to weigh in at every point in the scientific process 
where values are required, and even if we could, non-experts often will not have the scientific 
background to fully understand the options before them.  Substitutes for actual participation on 
the part of policy-makers or the public, such as asking scientists to predict what the public would 
choose or to determine what values policy-makers would hold upon reflection, seem to place 
unreasonable epistemic demands on scientists.
Douglas (2005), Intemann (2015), Guston (2004), and others have argued that these 
problems aren’t insurmountable, by suggesting specific ways that the concerns of policy-makers 
and the public can be brought into the scientific process.  And Kevin Elliott (2006; 2011) has 
suggested a more general way we might make progress.  The political view goes hand-in-hand 
with a view of the relationship between science and policy that is widely-held:  that the role of a 
scientist is to promote informed decision-making by policy-makers.   Bioethicists have 6
extensively discussed how health care professionals can promote informed decision-making on 
the part of patients and research subjects.  Theoretical and empirical research has led to a range 
of suggestions for how physicians can promote informed decision-making, even in cases where a 
patient’s values may be uncertain, different research subjects may hold different values, and so 
 This, of course, is proposed as a principle of professional ethics - not e.g. a legal requirement.5
 See also Resnik (2001), Martin and Schinzinger (2010), and Schroeder (2016) for theoretical defenses of this idea, which is 6
consonant with the mission statements of many scientific organizations and associations.
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forth.  Elliott’s hope is that many of these suggestions can be adapted to the scientific case, or at 
least a parallel research program could be carried out, informed by the work of bioethicists.7
It is, of course, far from established that these proposals will work, but the range of 
options on the table strikes me as cause for optimism.  And even if these solutions don’t work in 
all cases, there is still bite to the political view, since it could still tell scientists to use political 
values when they can determine those values.  Accordingly, in this paper I would like to describe 
a different and I think deeper concern with the political view, one which has been conspicuously 
absent from the literature thus far.  In requiring scientists to guide certain aspects of their work 
by political values, we will sometimes in effect ask that they support political causes they may 
personally oppose and bar them from fully advocating for their preferred policy measures.  We 
are, then, depriving scientists of important political rights possessed by the general public.  In the 
remainder of this paper, I will spell out this objection more fully and explain why I think it has 
significant moral force.  In the end, I will suggest that although there is reason to think that the 
objection doesn’t ultimately undermine the political view, it nevertheless constitutes a significant 
cost that accompanies that view, which its proponents need to acknowledge.
2.  Two Cases Where the Political View Seems Troublesome
The literature on values in science is vast and diverse, and so it will be useful to have 
some particular examples in mind.  First, consider Douglas’s (2000; 2009) argument that 
scientists should or must appeal to value judgments when resolving certain uncertainties that 
arise during the scientific process.  Scientists conducting research into the potential carcinogen 
dioxin, for example, were faced with liver samples which had tumors that could not clearly be 
 See also Schroeder (2016) for how this might go.7
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categorized as malignant or benign.  In resolving such borderline or ambiguous cases, Douglas 
argues that scientists should appeal to contextual values, when the constitutive norms of science 
don’t dictate any resolution.  In this case, health-protective values would lead scientists to 
classify borderline samples as malignant; while concerns about overregulation would lead 
scientists to classify those same samples as benign (Douglas 2000).  
Second, consider the many choices that scientists have to make when preparing their 
results for presentation.  How should uncertainty be characterized?  (Should 90% or 95% 
confidence intervals be used?)  Which study results should be highlighted?  (Which drug side 
effects should be discussed at length, and which included as part of a long list?)  How should 
statistics be summarized?  (As means or medians?  Should results be broken down by gender, or 
presented only in aggregate?)  In making choices like these, scientists frequently must appeal to 
values — to decide, for example, which pieces of information are important and which are not.8
It is, I presume, fairly uncontroversial that these value choices — how to resolve 
uncertainties in the research process and how to present results — can influence policy in 
foreseeable ways.  Douglas, for example, argues that this is the case in the dioxin studies.  
Classifying borderline samples as malignant will make dioxin appear to be a more potent 
carcinogen, likely leading policy-makers to regulate it more stringently (2000, 571).  Keohane, 
Lane, and Oppenheimer (2014) show how a presentation choice made by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change led to poor policy outcomes, which likely could have been avoided by 
presenting information differently.  More generally, we know from a wealth of studies in 
psychology and behavioral economics that the way information is presented to someone can 
strongly influence her subsequent choices (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), and there have been 
 For discussions, see Elliott (2006), Hardwig (1994), Keohane, Lane, and Oppenheimer (2014), Resnik (2001), and Schroeder 8
(2016).
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several influential commentaries calling for scientists to more carefully “frame” their results 
(Nisbet and Mooney 2007; Lakoff 2010).  So it seems straightforward that the value choices 
made by scientists can predictably affect policy.
If these value choices can influence policy, then in directing scientists to make them in 
accordance with political values — as opposed to the scientists’ personal values — we are asking 
scientists to characterize policy-relevant material in a way that may promote an outcome they 
strongly disfavor.  For example, suppose the scientists in Douglas’s dioxin study value public 
health much more than they value keeping industry free from overregulation, but the public and 
its elected representatives have the opposite view.  Further, suppose both views are substantively 
reasonable, in that they are within the range of policies eligible for adoption through democratic 
processes.  In this case, the political view would tell the scientists to categorize borderline 
samples as benign, since that would better cohere with the public’s values.  This could make 
dioxin appear to have minimal carcinogenic effects, predictably leading to less regulation than 
would have occurred had the scientists classified borderline samples according to their own, 
health-protective values.  Similarly, suppose an environmental economist conducting an impact 
study of a proposed construction project is herself deeply committed to the preservation of 
natural spaces.  Nevertheless, if the public is strongly committed to economic development, the 
political view would require her to put front-and-center a detailed breakdown of the economic 
consequences of construction, while describing the ecological costs more briefly or in a less 
prominent place — likely frustrating her desire for preservation.
Notice that the concern here is not simply that scientists are being asked to provide 
information that will lead to an outcome they disfavor.  I take it that any reasonable approach to 
scientific ethics will require that scientists communicate honestly, even in cases where that 
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promises to yield policies they don’t like.  Similarly, I presume that scientists must also be 
forbidden from presenting information in ways that, though technically accurate, are nevertheless 
misleading.  The problem here is that Douglas’s scientists are being asked to characterize results 
in one way (as benign) that could, with equal scientific validity, have been characterized 
differently (as malignant).  And our environmental economist is being asked to present her 
results in one way (highlighting economic benefits), when an alternate presentation (one 
highlighting ecological costs) would be equally honest, accurate, objective, transparent, clear, 
and so forth.  In each case, then, we have a collection of underlying data which can be described 
or characterized in different ways, neither of which appears to be more scientifically valid than 
the other.  The political view insists that scientists choose the description grounded in values they 
don’t accept and which seems likely to promote policy outcomes they disfavor.  In this respect, 
the political view requires scientists to in effect advocate for, or at least tilt the playing field 
towards, political views they disagree with.9
3.  Elliott and The Principle of Helpfulness
This seems clearly to be a significant imposition on scientists and thus a cost of the 
political view.  It is therefore surprising that, so far as I can tell, philosophers who have argued 
for the political view have not commented on it.  This is most striking in Elliott’s work.  Elliott, 
recall, argues that scientists should aim to promote informed decision-making among policy-
makers, in something like the way physicians should aim to promote informed decision-making 
among patients.  Standard accounts in bioethics say that it is the patient’s values that carry the 
 Can’t we let the scientists advocate for their preferred positions in other ways?  We could let scientists present their preferred 9
interpretation separately.  But if the political view is to have bite, presumably these alternate results will have to be clearly 
designated so and offered in a less prominent place (e.g. in an appendix or online supplement).  And we should of course permit 
scientists to advocate for their views outside of their scientific papers/reports.  But it seems likely that these (private) statements 
will carry much less policy weight than their scientific ones.
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day: in normal cases, the physician’s job is to help a patient make decisions that cohere with her 
own values.  If the scientific cases is analogous, then the scientist’s job is to help policy-makers 
make decisions that cohere with their (or the public’s) values.  This, in turn, suggests that 
scientists should use political values when resolving uncertainties, presenting results, and so 
forth.  In other words, Elliott’s proposal seems to imply the political view.10
The main defense Elliott offers for this view, however, relies on Scanlon’s “Principle of 
Helpfulness”:
Suppose I learn, in the course of conversation with a person, that I have a piece of 
information that would be of great help to her because it would save her a great deal of 
time and effort in pursuing her life’s project.  It would surely be wrong of me to fail 
(simply out of indifference) to give her this information when there is no compelling 
reason not to do so.11
Elliott sums up the idea this way:  “[I]n situations where one can significantly help another 
individual by engaging in an action that requires little sacrifice, it is morally unacceptable not to 
help” (2011, 139).  If the political view, however, requires characterizing data or presenting 
information in ways that promote policy choices a scientist strongly opposes, then this Principle 
doesn’t apply.  When the pro-health scientist is required to classify ambiguous samples as 
benign, that does involve a sacrifice.  A refusal to do so — which would hinder the pro-industry 
policy-maker’s ability to make an informed regulatory decision — would not be done “simply 
out of indifference”.  It would be done out of the scientist’s desire to protect public health.  
 In some work, Elliott appears to suggest that transparency about values may be enough (Elliott and Resnik 2014).  That is, he 10
doesn’t seem to place (many) constraints on scientists’ value choices, so long as they are open about those choices.  If that is 
Elliott’s view — and it is not clear to me that it is — it strikes me as in tension with his insistence that scientists promote 
informed decision-making.  Surely I can better help you make a decision that coheres with your values by working from your 
values, rather than by working from my own values (even if I am open about what I am doing).  Further, even if scientists are 
open about their value choices, policy-makers frequently won’t have the technical expertise to be able to reinterpret a scientific 
study, replacing one set of values (the scientist’s) with another (their own).  (If values could so easily be swapped out by non-
specialists, then much of the debate about values would be unimportant.  Transparency is all we would require.)
 Scanlon (1996, 224), quoted in Elliott (2011, 139).11
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(Similar things, obviously, can be said about the environmental economist asked to highlight the 
economic aspects of a proposed construction project.)
Scanlon’s Principle of Helpfulness is a quite weak one, applying only in cases where the 
agent in question can put forward no significant burden of compliance.  That Elliott uses it to 
justify his informed decision-making framework, and implicitly the political view, suggests that 
he thinks that such a view doesn’t impose significant burdens on scientists.  But if what I’ve said 
has been correct, that is wrong.  Even if the political view is justified — and, as I’ve said, I think 
it is — we need to recognize that it asks a lot of scientists in cases where their values diverge 
from those of the relevant political body.
4.  Physicians vs. Scientists
This, however, brings up an interesting question.  If Elliott is right that the scientific case 
is analogous to the biomedical case, then shouldn’t informed consent requirements in medicine 
be treated as similarly burdensome?  Few bioethicists, though, would have sympathy for a 
physician who claimed that seeking informed consent constituted a significant ethical burden.  
(They may have sympathy for the claim that seeking informed consent is burdensome in more 
mundane ways — e.g. too time-consuming — but those complaints seem very unlike the 
scientists’.)  I think that there is an important difference between the cases, which will help us to 
more clearly understand why the scientist is often burdened in a way that carries moral weight, 
while the physician normally is not.
We can see this by constructing a case which seems to put a physician in a position like 
the scientist’s.  Consider Jane, a doctor who strongly believes that the end of life for terminal 
patients is greatly enhanced by effective pain management, even if doing so shorten’s the 
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patient’s life or impairs his consciousness.  For this reason, Jane has chosen palliative care as her 
specialty, making it her life’s work to help dying patients avoid unnecessary pain.  One of her 
patients, John, has continually insisted that he wants to remain as lucid as possible, even if that 
means agony.  As he lies here, in agony, Jane suspects that if she framed the information properly 
— highlighting a medication’s ability to relieve pain, while downplaying its cognitive effects — 
she might be able to get John to accept it.  And accepting the medication, Jane strongly believes, 
would be much better for John.  Nevertheless, standard interpretations of informed consent 
forbid her from doing so.  Knowing that John is especially concerned about lucidity, she is 
ethically bound to highlight that information when informing him of his options.  Unsurprisingly, 
John declines the pain medication and experiences what Jane regards as an awful death — 
precisely the kind of thing she went into palliative care to prevent.
Like our pro-health scientist, Jane has been asked to present information in a way that 
ultimately frustrates her deeply-valued goals.  But imagine Jane complains to the ethics board at 
her hospital, arguing that it is burdensome to ask her to highlight to John the effects of pain 
medication on lucidity, because doing so would frustrate her deeply-held values.  This complaint 
doesn’t strike me as at all compelling.  Why?  Because Jane’s values shouldn’t hold any sway 
over John’s medical choices.  John has the right to reject pain medication, whatever Jane (or just 
about anyone else) thinks about it.  Put another way, John has no obligation to take Jane’s wishes 
into consideration, when he makes his decision.  His decision is ultimately his.
Now, imagine our pro-health scientist complains to her ethics committee, asserting that it 
is burdensome to ask her to present her data in a pro-industry light, when it could with equal 
scientific validity be presented in a pro-health light, because doing so would frustrate her deeply-
held concern for public health.  Or imagine the environmental economist complaining about 
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having to foreground the economic benefits of the proposed construction project, since doing so 
will make it more likely that the project is approved and another natural space will be bulldozed.  
If we assume that the scientists are citizens of the society in question, then their situation is 
different from Jane’s.  As citizens in a democracy, their views should hold some sway over their 
government’s policy choices.  A government does have an obligation to take its citizens’ views 
into consideration when making policy decisions.  And when the government ultimately acts, it 
does so on the scientists’ behalf.  The decision is, in part, the scientists’.
The scientists, then, are stakeholders and even part-decision-makers in the associated 
policy-decisions, in a way that Jane is not a stakeholder in John’s decision.  This is true even if 
Jane cares more about John’s decision than our scientists care about the policy decisions.  We can 
see, then, that the political view isn’t burdensome simply because it directs scientists to promote 
or advocate for outcomes they disfavor.  It is burdensome because it sometimes directs scientists 
to promote or advocate for disfavored views, on matters that they have a right to speak on, to a 
body that purports to act on their behalf.  This is what gives their burden its moral significance.12
5.  Justifying the Burdens of the Political View
Some scientists have recognized the burdens that even neutrality — let alone the political 
view — would impose on them.  
Conservation biology is inescapably normative. Advocacy for the preservation of 
biodiversity is part of the scientific practice of conservation biology.  If the editorial 
policy of or the publications in [the journal] Conservation Biology direct the discipline 
toward an “objective, value-free” approach, then they do not educate and transform 
society…  To pretend that the acquisition of “positive knowledge” alone with avert mass 
extinctions is misguided…  Without openly acknowledging such a perspective, 
 What about cases where the scientists are not citizens of the society in question?  In some cases, we can still make out a 12
stakeholder claim.  (When it comes to climate change, for example, we are all stakeholders in U.S. climate policy.)  But such 
cases raise complications which I unfortunately can’t discuss in a short paper like this one.
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conservation could become merely a subdiscipline of biology, intellectually and 
functionally sterile and incapable of averting an anthropogenic mass extinction.  (Barry 
and Oelschlaeger 1996)13
Most conservation biologists enter that field because of a strong commitment to the value of 
biodiversity and the preservation of nature (Marris 2006).  Similar things are surely true of other 
scientific disciplines.  (My experience has been that public health researchers and economists 
studying inequality disproportionately share certain political values.)  To the extent that these 
values diverge from the values of the public and its representatives, the political view would 
require these scientists to continually characterize their results in ways structured by a value 
system they find unacceptable.  (In this respect, things would be quite different for, say, climate 
scientists.  Although their work is controversial, it nevertheless is founded on values that are 
widely shared.  The potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change are ones that 
virtually everyone cares about.  Climate change deniers typically object to the empirical claims 
made by climate scientists - not to the basic values they hold.)
Is it fair, then, to tell a conservation biologist, who perhaps entered the field because of 
her love for natural spaces and has spent the bulk of her life collecting information that she hopes 
can be used to preserve them, that she is nevertheless ethically bound to resolve uncertainties in 
her research in ways favorable to economic growth, or to present her results in ways that 
highlight the economic value (as opposed to, say, the private or aesthetic value) of undeveloped 
land?  I don’t have a full answer to this question — such an answer would require more 
empirical information, as well as a fuller discussion of political philosophy — but I think we can 
see how the argument would go.  There are a range of situations in which we impose significant 
 This article was followed by a collection of commentaries, most of which generally supported the authors’ views.  Similar 13
proposals seem to crop up frequently among conservation biologists, and are generally endorsed by those in the field (Marris 
2006).
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restrictions on speech and advocacy for people in important social positions.  The Code of 
Conduct for U.S. judges, for example, bars judges from publicly endorsing candidates for 
political office and from making speeches for political organizations.   Uniformed U.S. military 14
personnel are not permitted to participate in political fundraising, speak at political events, or 
display political signs, even on their private vehicles.   Other constraints on speech and 15
advocacy seem ethically appropriate for politicians, police officers, lawyers, and others.  
So, if there is an important public good served by constraining scientists’ advocacy, it 
doesn’t seem in principle problematic to do so.  Two arguments along these lines seem 
promising.  First, a distinctly political approach might argue that although imposing this burden 
on scientists does restrict important political rights of speech and advocacy, it is done in order to 
expand the political rights of others.  By requiring scientists to work from the values of the 
public, the ability of the public to make informed policy choices and to effectively advocate for 
their own positions is enhanced.  Thus, although the political view constitutes a loss of political 
freedom to scientists, that loss is more than balanced by the gain in political freedom to the 
public as a whole.  (A view like this seems generally consistent with an approach to democracy 
like Brettschneider’s (2007).)
Second, a straightforwardly consequentialist argument could point out the terrible 
consequences that threaten to follow if the public and/or policy-makers distrust scientific results.  
One of the primary arguments that has been put forward in favor of informed-consent approaches 
in bioethics has been that it promotes trust on the part of patients.  Similarly, Elliott’s informed 
decision-making approach — which implies the political view — seems like a promising way to 
 http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges14
 http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/134410p.pdf15
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promote trust in science (Elliott 2011, 133-6; cf. Hardwig 1994; Resnik 2001).  If, then, the 
political view proves to be an effective way of promoting public trust in science, which in turn 
heads off the problems that ensue when policy-makers disregard science, that could justify 
imposing significant burdens on scientists.
Neither of these defenses, of course, is anywhere near complete.  But both do strike me as 
quite reasonable, and so I don’t think the concerns I’ve discussed in this paper should lead 
proponents of the political view to give up that position.  That said, it is important to note the 
form that these defenses take.  Neither attempts to show that the burden on scientists is not 
morally significant (as, perhaps, we might be inclined to say about the complaint of the palliative 
care physician).  Instead, they each point to compensating benefits — not necessarily enjoyed by 
the scientists in question — which morally outweigh the scientists’ burden.  This means that the 
political view, even if it is justified, comes at a real cost to scientists, which is something its 
proponents need to acknowledge.  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